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Reviews of Fiji and Papua New
Guinea are not included in this issue.
New Caledonia
For a nonelection year, 2003 proved
to be an eventful one in New Caledo-
nia. This was the 150th anniversary
of French annexation and also the
fifth year of the landmark Noumea
Accord peace agreement between 
pro-independence Kanak and loyalist
French residents and their respective
allies. French President Jacques Chirac
visited, as did other metropolitan offi-
cials, to give assurances of State sup-
port for the ongoing processes of eco-
nomic development and devolution of
governing powers to the territory
over the next fifteen years, and to
encourage further negotiations to
resolve lingering issues. It was a time
to reflect on the results of the accord
so far and to prepare for the 2004
provincial elections. The role of New
Caledonia and other French Pacific
territories as vehicles for French ini-
tiatives in the region, and the issue of
Polynesian migration from Wallis and
Futuna—and the consequent Kanak-
Wallisian violence in St Louis—gener-
ated further debate, as did the loca-
tion of an important Kanak identity
symbol in Noumea, the capital.
In March, Elie Poigoune, a Kanak
teacher who is president of the New
Caledonia chapter of the League of
the Rights of Man (ldh), traveled to
Paris to inform the parent organiza-
tion (equivalent to the American Civil
Liberties Union) about the status of
New Caledonia. ldh lawyers had
defended Poigoune and other anti-
colonial activists in the 1970s, and
one of them, Jean-Jacques de Félice,
was on hand to welcome his old com-
rade. Poigoune outlined the division
of his country between the Kanak-
ruled Northern Province and the
European-ruled South, and told of the
many challenges presented by multi-
national nickel mining projects in
both provinces. The ldh-nc had
joined the South’s local opposition to
the Goro/Prony arrangement with
Inco of Canada, because of the low
royalty payments it will pay to the
province and territory (only 10 per-
cent compared to the 51 percent own-
ership of the North in its partnership
with Falconbridge of Canada); the
hiring of foreign workers; and the
lack of consultation with local chiefs
and environmentalists. Poigoune also
raised the issues of the planned
cohabitation between Kanak custom
and French law, the need for further
development in education and health
care for the disadvantaged, and the
limited freedom of expression avail-
able in the local press and other
media. Despite the transfer of some
powers to the territory, key problems
remained, such as the creation of a
local citizenship; identity issues such
as a name for the country (he pro-
posed Kanaky New Caledonia); the
underdeveloped role of the new Cus-
tomary Senate; and the growing gap
between rich and poor—including
most Kanak. The ldh-nc recom-
mended that Kanak continue the
struggle for decolonization, because
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the Noumea Accord recognized their
identity but did not guarantee their
independence; and that non-Kanak
Caledonians stop fearing the Kanak,
try to understand Kanak culture bet-
ter, and seek an equilibrium between
the two communities in order to build
a common destiny (ldh-nc 2003).
Rock Wamytan, former president
of the Front de Libération Nationale
Kanak et Socialiste (flnks) and cur-
rent Minister of Cultural Affairs in
the territorial executive, also traveled
to Paris in March, to speak with
Brigitte Girardin, the French Minister
for Overseas Departments and Ter-
ritories. He asked for more direct
intervention by the French State to
“unblock” the Noumea Accord pro-
cess on several fronts, because the
opposing camps were not communi-
cating constructively. More progress
was needed in land reform to help the
colonially dispossessed Kanak, he said,
and he wondered if it would be neces-
sary to turn to the United Nations or
Ligue des Droits de l’Homme for help.
He also asked that the electorate issue
be resolved, instead of waiting until
2008 to limit voters on territorial
issues to long-term residents. He
admitted that the flnks, which still
lacked a president to replace him,
would have to elect one soon in order
to mobilize for the May 2004 provin-
cial elections. Wamytan then traveled
on to Canada to meet with Inco and
Falconbridge (NC, 8 March 2003).
In early May, the Noumea daily,
Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes, ran a
series of articles about the fifth
anniversary of the Noumea Accord,
calling it the foundation of the coun-
try’s institutional system. The series
explained in detail the negotiation
process that had led to loyalist
Jacques Lafleur’s “consensual solu-
tion” of 1998, which caused the
French State to revise its own national
constitution so as to legalize the
“Caledonian exception” to what had
been an indivisible, highly centralized
republic. It reminded readers that the
preamble of the accord acknowledged
the injustices inflicted on the Kanak
by French colonization and promised
“irreversible” devolution of governing
powers to the territory, though Lafleur
envisioned the outcome to be a com-
mon destiny with France while
Wamytan saw full independence as
the goal, with the Kanak people as the
core of a new nation. Lafleur praised
the restoration of peace the accord
had achieved, while Wamytan pointed
to still-unresolved issues, such as
favoring local citizens in hiring, and 
a lack of collegiality in the territorial
executive—which is dominated 8–3
by Lafleur’s loyalist Rassemblement
pour la Calédonie dans la République
(rpcr) and its Melanesian coalition
ally, the Fédération des Comités de
Coordination Indépendantistes (fcci)
(NC, 5–8 March 2003).
Pierre Frogier, president of the ter-
ritorial executive and deputy to the
French National Assembly, told his
colleagues in Paris that although the
anglophone Pacific Island states were
falling into anarchy, “We have the
ambition . . . to ensure that New
Caledonia does France proud” (pir,
10 June 2003). He hailed the path of
reconciliation and peace adopted in
his country and said that continued
development of nickel mining and
processing would make New Caledo-
nia, richly endowed with one third of
the world’s nickel reserves, a leading
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producer that is geographically close
to emerging markets for stainless steel
in China and India. On his return to
Noumea after a month in Paris, he
said, “It is necessary to be present 
in Paris and to work according to
Parisian methods, not Caledonian
methods.” He had to repeat over and
over to government officials and busi-
ness leaders in the French capital that
New Caledonia, unlike other overseas
territories, has an industrial and min-
ing base for development. He also
helped to prepare Girardin for her
visit the following week to attend a
meeting of the follow-up committee
of the Noumea Accord in Koné, in
the North, and to prepare Chirac for
his visit to New Caledonia in July and
for Chirac’s subsequent meeting in
Tahiti with leaders of French and
anglophone Pacific countries (NC,
13 June 2003).
Girardin arrived in mid-June for
her third visit to New Caledonia, to
encourage the Noumea Accord part-
ners, the flnks and rpcr, to dia-
logue frankly and constructively to
see to it that the agreement’s goals
were met. Frogier said the rpcr’s
quest was for development in the
interests of all the inhabitants, espe-
cially in mining: “Nickel is the future
of New Caledonia and we must not
fail!” Paul Neaoutyine, Kanak presi-
dent of the Northern Province and a
leader of pro-independence Palika
(Parti de Libération Kanak), noted
that Girardin said that violence was
no longer necessary to resolve difficul-
ties, and although she hedged on the
electorate issue, she assured him that
the financing of and technical advice
for the new nickel project in the
North were secure. Wamytan regret-
ted that the Union Calédonienne
(uc), of which he had once been pres-
ident, had boycotted the meeting in
Koné because of the electorate issue
(NC, 17 June 2003; pir, 17 June
2003). Lafleur said that the rpcr
understood the importance of the
voting issue to the flnks but that 
did not mean he had actually accepted
the concept of freezing the electorate
to include only those who were long-
term residents in 1998 and their
descendants; he did vow to promote
greater collegiality (ie, to share deci-
sion-making) in the territorial execu-
tive with the flnks (NC, 18 June
2003). On her way to Koné, Girardin
visited Ouvea, the island where
French special forces killed nineteen
Kanak militants after they had killed
six police and soldiers and had taken
twenty-seven hostage, during Chirac’s
first election campaign for the French
presidency. Girardin paid homage to
the dead on both sides in that tragedy,
which had in turn led to the 1989
assassination of Kanak peacemakers
Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene
Yeiwene by a Kanak separatist on
that island (pir, 25 April, 18 June
2003).
In late July, President Chirac
arrived, for his first visit in fifteen
years. Lafleur paved the way by say-
ing that Chirac had great affection for
New Caledonia and admired its ethnic
mosaic and evolution toward consen-
sus. He also clarified that “collegiality
does not mean consensus and that
consensus does not mean collegiality.”
He further warned, echoing Frogier
and other French leaders, “All Cale-
doniens must understand well, in
looking at other countries in the
Melanesian arc, how essential it is to
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have the support of a great nation.
. . . If we make a bad choice, we risk
failure. If we decide to stay within the
French nation, then this country will
be heading towards hope” (NC, 19
July 2003). A few days later, Chirac
himself congratulated New Caledonia
for having the will, after so much
suffering, to construct its future “in
peace and respect for others.” He
praised both Lafleur and Tjibaou, who
had signed the Matignon Accords in
1988, and vowed to remain vigilant
so that the territory would achieve its
great potential and also play a key
role in the Pacific. He planned to
revive French economic and technical
aid in the region, using New Caledo-
nia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and
Futuna as intermediaries, because
“France is an agent for stability in the
South Pacific” (NC, 23 July 2003).
Local leaders had high hopes for
Chirac’s public speech in the Place 
des Cocotiers in Noumea. The flnks
called on its followers to attend and
listen carefully, as did the loyalists,
while labor unions hoped to hear
support for the local hiring and citi-
zenship issues as well as improved
social programs, and the right-wing
National Front expected Chirac to
clearly reject the restricted electorate
idea. Said Guy George, “If the elec-
torate is frozen, the Melanesians will
be a majority for the referendum [on
independence] in 2013 or 2015. It’s
unacceptable!” Aloisio Sako of the
pro-independence Wallisian Rassem-
blement Démocratique Océanien
(rdo) told his followers to listen for
the opposite, saying that “the Nou-
mea Accord is an act of reconciliation
among all Caledonians.” He also crit-
icized the French State for mishan-
dling the Kanak-Wallisian conflict in
St Louis. Instead of heeding the rdo’s
proposal of a customary “Oceanian
solution,” the State had treated the
violence as criminal and allowed the
situation to get worse, risking more
racism among ethnic groups. Wal-
lisians had come as laborers, he said,
not as invaders: “They simply partici-
pated in the construction of this
country and would now like to have 
a place in the sun!” Nidoish Naisse-
line of the Islands Province–based
Libération Kanak Socialiste (lks)
complained about the economic
marginalization of the outer islands 
in current development plans that
stress nickel mining and, as a high
chief on Mare, stressed the hope that
France would ratify the 1989 conven-
tion on the rights of indigenous peo-
ples, in order to separate the issues 
of political independence and cultural
identity (NC, 23 July 2003).
Chirac spoke to an audience of
thousands on 24 July, while the uc
and the militant labor union ustke
(Union Syndicaliste des Travailleurs
Kanak et Exploités) protested. He
expressed affection, confidence, and
hope for New Caledonia’s bright
future, which would be both “in the
Republic and in the Pacific.” He
avoided the electorate and local hiring
issues but vowed to enforce the appli-
cation of the Noumea Accord, to
promote economic progress, and to
respect the people’s choices: “I like
this land.” He highlighted the “strate-
gic position” of the territory in the
heart of a region that is becoming 
one of the most important in the
world. He promised financial aid, 
not for dependence, but for sustain-
able development, adding that France
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had recently sent out a message of
peace and respect for law and dia-
logue. In a multipolar world of supra-
national groupings (eg, the European
Union and United Nations), Chirac
said, “I am convinced that the interest
of a collectivity, once its personality is
respected, its identity is preserved,
and its development is assured, lies
not in separatism and withdrawal, but
to the contrary in adhesion to a larger,
united community. That is France’s
proposition” (NC, 24 July 2003).
Other metropolitan visitors echoed
the optimism of Chirac, Lafleur, and
Frogier. In August, French diplomat
Alain Christnacht, who had played
such an important role in negotiating
the Matignon and Noumea Accords,
visited New Caledonia to promote his
new book, L’Oeil de Matignon (The
Eye of Matignon). He said he hoped
the book would stimulate Caledo-
nians to think critically and develop
their own opinions about the peace
agreements of the past fifteen years.
He looked back at the reform propos-
als of Paul Dijoud in the late 1970s
and the Nainville-les-Roches negotia-
tions of 1983, which had laid out
compromises similar to what was
achieved after the tragic events of the
1980s: “There have been long years
of maturing here . . . and people want
to stop hitting the wall and to find a
door” (NC, 4 August 2003). Christ-
nacht’s negotiating strategy had
always been to gather the antagonists,
help them to speak to each other,
write down what divided them and
what united them, seek the most com-
mon denominators, and postpone for
later the hardest issues—for instance,
independence. He said that New
Caledonia, with its colonially created
ethnic bipolarity, provided a test case
for finding ways for different peoples
to live together, with “two competing
legitimacies that are equally valid” to
prevent a sovereignty that either Euro-
peans or Kanak alone can control.
“The frontier between dependence
and independence has evolved well,”
he said. “We are in a universe that
moves and the conception of indepen-
dence in 2000 cannot be the same as
in 1970” (NC, 8 August 2003).
In September, deputies and senators
of the French Parliament came to the
territory and concluded that every-
thing was moving in the right direc-
tion, noting the progress being made
on the Northern nickel plant; what
they regarded as collegiality among
local leaders; and the prospect of a
consensual solution to the electorate
issue, while awaiting a decision of the
European Court of Justice on restrict-
ing local voting rights (NC, 6 Sept,
19 Sept, 2003). Meanwhile, French
aid money continued to flow into the
territory. Two new Airbuses arrived
to help the local regional carrier, Air
Calédonie International (or Aircalin),
to replace Air France on the
Noumea–Tokyo/Osaka route and
facilitate rising Japanese tourism 
(NC, 6 Jan, 13 March 2003), while a
third Airbus will provide links to the
South Pacific (pir, 1 April 2003). The
smooth transfer of some Air France
staff to Aircalin was marred by Air-
calin’s refusal to hire steward Bruno
Van Peteghem, a local Green Party
and environmental activist; the ldh
protested that political action (NC,
8 April 2003). Robert Xowie and
Richard Kaloi of the Islands Province
went to Paris to ask for help in trans-
port links between the outer islands
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and Noumea, since so many of their
constituents migrated to work in the
South (NC, 28 Feb, 12 March 2003),
but talk of raising fares for Air Calé-
donie, the domestic carrier, drew
protests and blockades of airstrips in
the Islands Province. Two ferryboats
provide alternative transport (pir,
15 April, 30 April 2003). The French
State provided the equivalent of us$7
million to improve high school edu-
cation in the South (NC, 6 March
2003), compared to $1.2 billion for
increasing nickel processing capacity
in the North and South, each of
which got half (NC, 17 Dec 2003),
and just before Christmas, the New
Caledonia Congress voted for a 2004
territorial budget of $1 billion (NC,
24 Dec 2003).
On the regional front, Wamytan
attended the thirteenth Conference 
of Heads of States or Government of
the Non-Aligned Countries (nam) in
Malaysia in February, where he dis-
cussed the shortcomings of the imple-
mentation of the Noumea Accord,
such as the collegiality and electorate
issues. In Canada afterwards, he
raised environmental concerns about
the Goro/Prony mining project in the
South, where he is a customary chief,
and attended the Assembly of First
Nations to hear the debate about the
impact of the Voisey Bay plant on the
Inuits (NC, 25 Feb 2003). France pro-
posed to increase development aid to
Pacific Islands countries by 50 per-
cent, with a primary focus on boost-
ing private investment, creating jobs
for young people, and improving
transportation connections (pir, 17
March, 30 July, 4 Aug 2003; NC, 30
July 2003), but both the flnks and
Australia resisted French offers to
contribute troops to the Solomon
Islands peacekeeping mission, to
avoid giving the intervention a “neo-
colonial” look (pir, 27 June, 3 July
2003). Both the Pacific Forum and
Melanesian Spearhead Group (msg)
continued to welcome New Caledonia
and the flnks as observers and to
monitor the movement of French
Polynesia toward “overseas country”
status (pir, 22 Aug 2003). Wamytan,
the current msg president, and Oscar
Temaru, a pro-independence leader in
Tahiti, both spoke out against allow-
ing France to join either organization.
They called the Gaston Flosse regime
in French Polynesia a Trojan horse for
French interests in the region, with
Chirac playing “checkbook” diplo-
macy, and demanded that French
Polynesia be put on the UN decolo-
nization list (pir, 4 Aug 2003; abc
ran 15 Aug 2003). Chirac said that
France would take responsibility for
illnesses resulting from French nuclear
testing in the Tuamotus, if someone
could actually provide proof, but he
said all studies so far show that
French testing was completely safe
(pir, 30 July 2003).
As New Caledonian political par-
ties began to mobilize for the May
2004 provincial elections, which
ultimately determine the composition
of the congress and executive as well,
dissension continued in both the loy-
alist and pro-independence camps.
Didier Leroux of the loyalist Alliance
publicly debated Lafleur on local tele-
vision in April, criticizing the rpcr-
dominated South for giving away
mining rights to the Prony site near
Inco’s Goro-Nickel project; complain-
ing that the closing of Air France in
New Caledonia left the territory with-
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out a direct air link to France; warn-
ing about the growing social problems
of squatter camps around Noumea;
and noting the lack of territorial
vision because so much authority has
been delegated to the provinces (NC,
10 April 2003). He also said the
forced relocation of Polynesian fami-
lies from St Louis approached “ethnic
cleansing” and voiced strong opposi-
tion to freezing the electorate for pro-
vinical elections (NC, 4 July 2003).
Within the fcci, the rpcr’s coalition
partner, dissidents in the Islands Prov-
ince in March vowed to strengthen
ties with other pro-independence
parties (NC, 5 March 2003), while 
the rpcr paid homage to Melane-
sians who had long supported it (NC,
7 March 2003). Former rdo leader
Tino Manuohalalo, excluded from the
flnks in 2002, formed his own party
in April, the Mouvement des Citoyens
Calédoniens, with a loyalist inclina-
tion. He vowed to defend the interests
of Wallisians and Futunans in New
Caledonia while working for a just
multiethnic society, and proposed a
compromise on the electorate issue:
freeze voting rights in the 2018 refer-
endum on independence to those resi-
dent for twenty years (ie, since the
1998 Noumea Accord), but allow
people of ten years residence to vote
in provincial elections (NC, 2 Aug
2003; pir, 15 April 2003).
Manuohalalo’s former boss, Aloisio
Sako, was reelected rdo president in
February on a platform of working at
the grassroots level to improve social
and economic conditions for the
poor, such as the squatters, and of
encouraging more respect and toler-
ance among ethnic groups, to over-
come the sad legacy of St Louis (NC,
17 Feb, 21 Feb 2003). The rdo is a
full member of the flnks and sup-
ports independence, but the flnks
itself continued to suffer from dis-
sension between the uc, which is
increasingly militant, and its other
members, Palika and the Union Pro-
gressiste Mélanésienne (upm). Lack-
ing a president (since neither Wamy-
tan and Neaoutyine won decisive
support in late 2001), the flnks has
tried to follow the Palika precedent
of operating a political bureau by
consensus, but the uc has made that
system difficult. The flnks congress
had to be postponed in December
2002 and again in February 2003
(pir, 28 Jan 2003). Refusing to
appear subservient to Lafleur’s rpcr,
two out of three flnks ministers in
the territorial executive still had not
left the old offices to move into the
new annex of the Southern Province
headquarters: Vice-President Déwé
Gorodé (Palika) remained in her old
office and continued to work there,
while Gerald Cortot (uc) remained 
in his old office without the technical
means to work. Only Wamytan
(flnks) moved into the new offices
(NC, 29 Jan 2003). At its own party
congress in February, the uc vowed
to work for the full implementation
of the Noumea Accord, including the
frozen electorate and improved colle-
giality, and refused to participate in
an flnks congress until its three part-
ners, who have been more pragmatic
and willing to negotiate with the
rpcr and Paris, adopted the same
stand (NC, 19 Feb 2003).
During Chirac’s visit, hundreds 
of uc supporters and the ustke pro-
tested separately against the lack of
implementation of key accord provi-
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sions, and Pascal Naouna (uc) was
later interrogated by the police (NC,
26 July, 10 Sept 2003). While the
flnks held congresses in May and
August, the uc, which celebrated its
fiftieth anniversary, either boycotted
or demanded postponements, criticiz-
ing flnks cooperation with the
French State, which it said only pre-
tended to be a neutral partner in the
Noumea Accord, and warning against
Chirac’s plans to increase French
influence in the region (NC, 13 Aug,
25 Aug 2003). In September, flnks
spokesman Victor Tutugoro (upm)
noted significant progress toward
realization of the new nickel process-
ing plant in the North and said that
Chirac had personally promised to
help resolve the electorate issue (NC,
1 Sept 2003). In December, the flnks
tried another congress but still could
not elect a president and suspended
discussions after one day. Tutugoro
said that the consensus system was
not working and that another deci-
sion-making mechanism (voting?)
might be needed, but that delegates
had agreed to pursue a broader politi-
cal strategy in the South, seeking left-
ist allies and encouraging the many
Kanak working there to vote locally
instead of in their home villages. The
flnks planned to try another congress
in April 2004, as each party refined
its program for the elections. It noted
with satisfaction that New Caledonia
and Wallis and Futuna had signed a
special accord in Paris, whereby
France would spend more money
developing the latter territory in order
to deter more Polynesian immigration
to the former, that land reform con-
tinued in the South, and that a com-
mittee had formed to create a national
anthem (NC, 12 Dec, 15 Dec 2003;
flnks 26th Congress Report, 13 Dec
2003).
Despite the rosy picture painted 
by Chirac and the rpcr, resentments
grew over a number of issues. One
was the cancellation of a census,
because Chirac opposed taking
account of ethnic affiliation, calling
such a statistic “irresponsible and ille-
gal.” The ldh and pro-independence
groups supported collecting ethnic
statistics because they would show
how numerous and disadvantaged 
the indigenous population was (NC,
5 Aug, 7 Aug 2003; rnzi, 28 July, 
6 Aug 2003). Another issue was the
proposed classification of New Cale-
donia’s coral reef, second in size only
to Australia’s, as a unesco World
Heritage site. The French Green Party,
local environmentalists like Van
Peteghem, the Kanak Customary Sen-
ate, and the presidents of the North
and Islands Provinces had supported
the proposal in 2002, but Girardin
had wanted a “consensus” among the
three provinces first, asking everyone
to study the situation “serenely.”
Lafleur had asserted the right of the
South to resist interference from a
metropolitan “lobby” and to formu-
late its own agreement with Inco as
it developed the Goro/Prony nickel
project (NC, 20 Feb 2003). During
his visit, Chirac paid lip service to
respecting the environment but urged
“serenity and pragmatism” regarding
the coral reef: “It’s up to the Prov-
inces” (NC, 24 July 2003). Faced with
rising immigration during the new
nickel boom, powerful labor unions
became militant about favoring local
hiring and conducted a series of
strikes. A French Ministry of Educa-
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tion official admitted that the terri-
tory lacked the infrastructure to train
a sufficiently skilled workforce for an
economy based on nickel (pir, 18
April 2003; NC, 5 March, 4 Sept, 4
Oct 2003). Civil servants also demon-
strated in April and struck in May
and June to protect their pension
funds, as retirees increase faster 
than new hires and the government
planned to increase worker contribu-
tions to cover a growing deficit. One
building was bombed, but the New
Caledonia Congress finally passed a
controversial reform. Critics called
the inflationary high salaries of civil
servants a vestige of colonial privi-
leges (NC, 7 March, 12 June 2003;
pir, 7 April, 15 May 2003).
Three issues perhaps best symbol-
ize the growing pains of increasingly
autonomous New Caledonia: the
Goro/Prony nickel project in the
South, the violence and evictions at
Ave Maria in St Louis, and the place-
ment of a Kanak totem pole in Nou-
mea on the 150th anniversary of
French annexation. The Inco project
at Goro was launched by the South
with a goal of producing 60,000 tons
of processed nickel per year by 2005
to meet the rising demand in China,
but work on the site had to be
stopped twice because of disputes
over local hiring and its environmen-
tal impact. Cost overruns reached 
45 percent at the end of 2002, so 
the project was suspended while Inco
reviewed it. Meanwhile, Kanak chiefs
wanting to secure transport and other
jobs for their people traveled to
Toronto to see Inco ceo Scott Hand
and also to examine the Voisey Bay
project in Labrador and its impact on
the Inuit. They concluded that the
Inuit had a better deal, so they met
again with Hand in Noumea in April,
but after offering him a customary
welcome, their dialogue was margin-
alized by the arrival of Pierre Frogier
and other rpcr officials. Hand vowed
to implement a “good neighbor agree-
ment” by consulting more with local
landowners (pir, 8 April 2003;
Boengkih 2003). Inco also agreed to
help finance job training for the pro-
ject, which was projected to create
2,500 new positions, 90 percent of
which were supposed to go to locals
(NC, 13 Feb 2003). Several local
groups, from the ldh to the National
Front, wanted to have Inco’s near-
gratis prospecting permit for the
nearby Prony vein rescinded, because
the province and territory would
already get such low royalties for
Goro (10 percent), and the environ-
mental impact on the coral reef from
strip mining and processing with 
acids were of deep concern to many.
Finally, just before Christmas, a
Noumea court nullified that permit
(NC, 1 March 2003; pir, 5 March, 
10 March 2003; Duparc 2003).
Since late 2001, indigenous Kanak
and immigrant Wallisians and Futu-
nans have been fighting over twenty-
three hectares of land at the Catholic
mission called Ave Maria, near the
town of St Louis outside Noumea.
The Polynesians had begun to settle
there in the 1960s, but because of
their enlistment as loyalists during the
troubled 1980s they became symbols
of outsider competition and domina-
tion. For two years now, opposing
young fighters have burned homes,
killed three people, wounded others,
and even attacked local chiefs. The
problem was made worse by rivalry
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between Wamytan and another Kanak
chief, Robert Moyatea; divisions
among Wallisians such as Sako and
Father Iau Sagnato; and lack of inter-
vention by the State or the Southern
Province, other than armed force.
Fresh violence erupted in late June,
and in late August, 250 French police
and special forces, backed by ten
armored vehicles, dozens of trucks,
and two helicopters, stormed the vil-
lage of St Louis, arrested ten people,
and confiscated weapons and ammu-
nition. The power line from Noumea
to Yate dam was sabotaged twice, and
remaining Wallisian families had to be
moved to a gymnasium for safety.
Finally the government began to
enforce an agreement that had been
worked out in December 2002,
namely, the relocation of all the Poly-
nesians in Ave Maria to new housing
in Dumbéa and other suburbs of
Noumea, with financial support from
the French State, the territory, and the
Southern Province. Evictees have sued
for compensation, as has the power
company, and critics of State handling
of the situation called it “ethnic
cleansing” as bulldozers demolished
the last Wallisian homes in September
(pir, 27 June, 1 July, 17 July, 4 Sept
2003; NC, 2 July, 26 Aug, 5 Sept, 16
Sept 2003). In December, a special
accord between New Caledonia, Wal-
lis and Futuna, and France tried to
resolve the issue by promising more
development aid to Wallis and Futuna
in hopes of keeping people home (NC,
3 Dec 2003).
On 24 September, the 150th
anniversary of the French unilateral
“taking possession” of New Caledo-
nia was commemorated. To white
Caledonians, it marks the date their
identity began, while most Kanak
treat it as a day of national mourning.
But this year, a nonpartisan “150
Years After Committee” tried to come
up with an act of reconciliation. It
consulted widely, held meetings and
workshops, and decided to have a
sacred mwâ kâ (Kanak totem pole)
carved and brought in a celebratory
procession to be installed in the Place
des Cocotiers in Noumea, once an
almost exclusively white colonial
citadel. It is twelve meters high (one
meter for each month of the year);
weighs three tons (for the three prov-
inces); was carried in turns by 150
people (one for each year of French
rule); and was carved by indigenous
sculptors from each of the eight
Kanak cultural-linguistic regions. It
was intended to symbolize a shared
past and a common future, with even
a piece of nickel embedded in its 
base, and the committee arranged for
speeches, music, and dances to honor
the occasion. But Noumea Mayor
Jean Lèques refused to allow the pole
to be installed in the Place des Coco-
tiers, because it did not fit the other
architecture there, such as a statue 
of the governor who suppressed the
1878 Kanak revolt, a water fountain
with a Greco-Latin statue, and a
bandstand in Napoleon III–style.
Lafleur and Frogier resolved the crisis
by offering space in the courtyard of
the Southern Province building, much
to the chagrin of Kanak activists, who
regarded that as yet another sign of
submission or appropriation. Worse,
when Lafleur greeted the Kanak chiefs
accompanying the 4,000 participants,
he said, “I thought that since I am the
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Southern Province’s Chief, I might
drop by and speak here today.” A
more permanent site was proposed in
the parking lot across from the Terri-
torial Museum, which drew the com-
ment from critics, “Hardly born,
already mummified!” (Caillard and




abc ran, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, Radio Australia News.
<http://www.abc.net.au/ra/> 
Boengkih, Jacques Sarimin, personal com-
munication, 22 April 2003.
Caillard, Françoise, and Jean-Paul Cail-
lard, personal communication, 27 Sept
2003.
Duparc, Bernard, personal communica-
tion, 22 Dec 2003.
ldh-nc, Ligue des Droits de l’Homme,
Nouvelle-Calédonie, Communiqué, 4
March 2003.
NC, Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes. Daily.
Noumea.
pir, Pacific Islands Report.
<http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport> 
rnzi, Radio New Zealand International
News. <http://www.rnzi.com>
Solomon Islands 
The period from late 1998 to 2003
was the most challenging for Solomon
Islands since independence in 1978.
Violent civil unrest on the island of
Guadalcanal, which led to a coup on
5 June 2000, had an adverse impact
on the country, bringing to the fore
political, social, and economic issues
that had long existed but had not
been adequately addressed by succes-
sive governments. 
However, despite the dramatic
events of the previous four years,
perhaps the highlight of 2003 was
Canberra’s decision to lead a Pacific
Islands Forum intervention force to
restore law and order and rebuild
Solomon Islands. Although the most
troops and police came from Austra-
lia, other Forum member countries
also contributed, resulting in the
largest military and police deploy-
ment in the region since World War
II. Canberra’s decision reflected con-
cerns that the events in Solomon
Islands could become a security threat
for Australia (aspi 2003). The action
illustrates how internal instability was
viewed as a potential source of exter-
nal threat, and highlights the changes
in global security discourses following
the terrorist attacks on the United
States on 11 September 2001. The
intervention also marked a dramatic
change in regional politics; it was the
first time that the Forum played an
assertive role in the domestic affairs
of a member country. 
By the beginning of 2003, although
Solomon Islands was no longer expe-
riencing the overt violence that char-
acterized the period from 1999 to
2000, problems with law and order,
a declining economy, an inefficient
public service, and a relatively weak
state persisted, contributing to low
public morale and a lack of trust in
the state. 
The law and order problems were
worsened by the fact that, despite the
October 2000 signing of the Towns-
 
394 the contemporary pacific • fall 2004
ville Peace Agreement with its
requirement for militants to surrender
their arms, many continued to hold
on to weapons, which they used to
commit crimes. The ability of the
police to enforce the law was weak-
ened because some police officers had
either joined or were sympathetic to
the two major militant groups
involved in the conflict: the Isatabu
Freedom Movement (ifm) and the
Malaita Eagle Force (mef). Further-
more, in 2000 and 2001 many former
militants (who did not have appropri-
ate qualifications or training) had
been recruited as special constables.
This compromised the professional-
ism of the police. 
Economically, the government’s
capacity to collect revenue and man-
age the economy was severely weak-
ened by the inefficiency of the public
service and the lack of finance.
Hence, by mid 2003 the country’s
debt was registered at a$352 million,
more than three times the country’s
annual budget. The Central Bank of
Solomon Islands (cbsi) described the
situation vividly: “Since 2000, the
Solomon Islands economy had
severely contracted causing a fall in
incomes, increased unemployment
and widespread poverty, and the
delivery of social services, particu-
larly in the education and health
sectors. In fact, without the goodwill
of the donor community, services in
these two important sectors would
have discontinued early in the year”
(cbsi 2003, 6).
The poor economic performance
was exacerbated by the closure of
major industries such as the oil palm
plantation and the Gold Ridge mine
on Guadalcanal, in 1999 and 2000
respectively.
At the beginning of 2003, nature
added to the country’s woes when
tropical cyclone Zoe battered the
eastern Solomons, especially the
remote island of Tikopia. At the
national capital, Honiara, people
rallied together through fund-raising
activities and donations of goods 
and building materials to assist the
Tikopians. However, their ability to
assist was limited by the economic
problems.
The economic and sociopolitical
problems were reflected in the declin-
ing ability of the government to pro-
vide adequate, quality social services;
protect its citizens; and pay its
employees. There was also a general
decline in the standard of living.
Solomon Islands was named as one 
of four Pacific Island Countries where
living standards fell in the decade
between 1990 and 2001. The others
were Vanuatu, Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands, and the Federated States
of Micronesia (undp 2003). 
Because of the government’s inabil-
ity to pay its employees, 2003 was
marked by strikes and threats of
strikes by public employees. In Janu-
ary 2003, for example, employees of
the Civil Aviation as well as Immigra-
tion and Meteorology officers walked
off their jobs after the government
delayed payment of “harassment
allowances” awarded earlier by the
Trade Disputes Panel. These allow-
ances were to be paid to public offi-
cers who had worked under duress
during the heights of the civil unrest.
Their example was emulated by
teachers who, in March, went on
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strike to force the government to pay
at least half of the salary arrears they
were due.
While many public servants were
either not paid or owed outstanding
wages and allowances, police officers
were consistently being paid their
normal salaries plus “allowances.” 
In April, for example, they demanded
and received si$26 million “allow-
ance” after threatening employees 
of the Ministry of Finance.
The economic problem and peo-
ple’s desperation for income led to the
emergence and persistence of “pyra-
mid schemes” that promised lucrative
financial returns. Thousands of peo-
ple, mostly (but not exclusively) low-
income earners, market vendors, and
betel nut sellers, poured their savings
into these schemes. The most popular
was the Family Charity Fund (fcf)
which promised to pay contributors
si$2 million (us$285,000) each in
return for si$250 (us$36) member-
ship. Despite warnings from the cbsi
governor, the prime minister, and
other public officers, membership of
the scheme rose to about 18,000 in
early 2003. But contributors were
never paid and it wasn’t clear where
the money went. The fcf leaders pro-
vided many excuses and blamed the
prime minister, the cbsi governor, and
commercial banks for delaying the
payments. This led to death threats
against employee of the anz Bank,
resulting in the closure of commercial
banks in Honiara in early May 2003.
The fcf leaders were subsequently
arrested and charged with fraud and
threatening public safety, and by the
end of 2003 most of them had been
convicted and jailed. 
However, not only private citizens
were trapped by dubious financial
schemes that promised riches. The
government, with its desperate finan-
cial situation, also bought into such 
a scheme. In January 2003 the media
reported that the national government
had signed a memorandum of under-
standing with a little-known organi-
zation called the Royal Association 
of Nations and Kingdoms, led by a
Bougainvillean, Noah Masingku. 
The memorandum stated that the
association would give the govern-
ment “a grant” of us$2.6 billion. 
This attracted widespread criticism
from the public, the Parliamentary
opposition, and the cbsi governor. 
It was later revealed that the arrange-
ment involved the government being
required to pay the Royal Association
of Nations and Kingdoms si$10 mil-
lion before the grant was to be
released. Furthermore, it was uncov-
ered that Masingku was wanted for
fraud relating to a pyramid scheme in
Papua New Guinea and had entered
Solomon Islands without a passport.
The authorities in Port Moresby
requested that he be arrested and
deported back to Papua New Guinea
to face charges. 
Although this was an embarrass-
ment for the government, no investi-
gation was carried out to determine
who was responsible or whether they
had done anything wrong in commit-
ting the government to such a deal. 
The continuing law and order
problem and the inability of the state
to protect citizens compounded the
country’s economic woes. While most
parts of the country were relatively
peaceful, certain areas continued to
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suffer lawlessness. The Guadalcanal
Liberation Front, led by the notorious
Harold Keke, for example, ruled parts
of the Weather Coast of Guadalcanal,
and throughout 2002 and the first
half of 2003, Keke and his followers
threatened and murdered more than
twenty people in the areas they con-
trolled. This included seven members
of the Melanesian Brotherhood, a
religious order in the Church of
Melanesia (Anglican Church). Ten
Malaita men who were allegedly sent
to capture Keke were also killed. 
Atrocities and human rights abuses
were also committed by police officers
and civilians sent to capture Keke and
his followers. Incidents occurred else-
where in the country as well. On 18
May, for example, an Australian mis-
sionary, Lance Gersbach, was mur-
dered at Atoifi Seventh Day Adventist
Hospital on Malaita. 
Despite the problems mentioned
above, some people and organizations
continued to work to try and bring
normalcy back to the country. These
included both local and international
organizations, as well as village lead-
ers working to rebuild relationships
and restore peace. The Solomon
Islands Christian Association, for
example, worked on a proposal to
establish a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. The National Peace
Council continued its work in assist-
ing reconciliation at community levels
as well as encouraging people to
return weapons. Village leaders and
women’s organizations continued to
facilitate reconciliations between com-
munities. In September 2003, for
instance, a group of Guadalcanal
women traveled to Malaita and had a
reconciliation ceremony with women
from the Takwa Catholic Parish in
North Malaita (sibc, 15 Sept 2003). 
The United Nations Development
Program (undp) facilitated discus-
sions on constitutional reform to help
establish a federal system of govern-
ment. It was also instrumental in the
Special Constables Demobilization
Project, which aimed to retrieve guns
from special constables and involve
them in economically and socially
productive activities. By January 2003
about 800 special constables had been
demobilized. The project, however,
suffered a setback on 10 February
2003, when a member of the demobi-
lization team, former Commissioner
of Police Sir Fredrick Soaki, was
assassinated at Auki by a police offi-
cer. This shocked the entire country,
especially given Sir Fred’s status.
The success of the peace-building
process was greatly limited by the
continuing presence of weapons in 
the communities. Many of the former
militants refused to give up arms
because it was their only source of
status and power. 
Despite its domestic problems,
Solomon Islands continued to main-
tain its links with the outside world
and participate in regional and
international forums. For example,
although the government defaulted 
on its contributions to the University
of the South Pacific (usp), its students
continued to be accepted; they make
up the second largest student popula-
tion (after Fiji Islanders) at the Uni-
versity. This was possible because of
the understanding and acceptance of
other usp member countries. 
Furthermore, Solomon Islands
continued to participate at the Pacific
Islands Forum and other regional
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organizations as well as international
organizations such as the United
Nations. This demonstrated that
despite its domestic problems the
Solomon Islands state was recognized
and accepted in the international
arena. Hence, despite its relative weak-
ness at home, the government was
able to draw strength and legitimacy
from the international community.
Its bilateral relations were also
maintained. On 20 May, for example,
the Indonesian ambassador, based in
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea,
arrived in Solomon Islands for an
official visit in which the countries
agreed to technical cooperation. This
visit led to the signing of an agree-
ment on 15 July outlining a mutual
technical agreement between Indone-
sia and Solomon Islands, including
cooperation in areas such as marine,
forestry, agriculture, journalism, and
cultural exchanges.
At the end of May—only days
after the visit of the Indonesian
ambassador—Honiara again hosted a
delegation of the Senate Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference
Committee of the Australian Parlia-
ment. This was part of a visit by the
committee to five Pacific Island coun-
tries (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Solomon Islands) to con-
duct an enquiry into Australian rela-
tionship with the Pacific Islands.
In spite of the relative strength and
legitimacy drawn from international
interactions, at home the govern-
ment’s authority continued to be
challenged, especially by those with
guns who knew that the government’s
ability to apprehend them was slim.
Consequently, since the signing of the
Townsville Peace Agreement, Solo-
mon Islands remained in a state of
“latent peace”—a situation where
there was fear for the potential for
violence in society. 
Things began to change dramati-
cally on 4 June, when Solomon Islands
Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza and
some officials were summoned to
Canberra. The Australian Govern-
ment sent an Australian Air Force
plane to airlift the delegation to
Canberra where, on 5 June, they met
with Australian Prime Minister John
Howard. At that meeting the Austral-
ian government offered to assist Solo-
mon Islands restore law and order
and rebuild the country. 
Canberra’s decision came amid
ongoing discussions in Australia
regarding security in a post–September
11th era, and Australia’s role in the
region. The Australian Strategic Pol-
icy Institute (aspi), a conservative
think tank, for example, argued that
Australia needed to intervene in
Solomon Islands to prevent the state
from “failing.” There were concerns
that a failed state could be used by
terrorists to threaten Australia (aspi
2003).
The news of Australia’s plan to
intervene and the Kemakeza govern-
ment’s acceptance of the offer received
different reactions in Solomon Islands.
Those with guns who benefited from
the way things were did not want the
intervention. When they realized that
it was inevitable, some attempted to
extort as much money from the gov-
ernment as they could before the
intervention forces arrived. On 11
July, for instance, armed police had to
disperse about 200 mef militants at
the Office of the Prime Minister and
Ministry of Finance where they had
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gathered to demand si$1.4 million
“to help them return to their villages
on Malaita” (sibc, 11 July 2003). On
the Weather Coast of Guadalcanal,
Harold Keke and his followers took
about 400 people hostage at Marasa
Village amid fears that he would use
them as a human shield to fight off
the intervention forces (sibc, 17 June
2003).
For weeks the Australian interven-
tion plan dragged slowly because
Canberra required an official request
from the Solomon Islands governor-
general on the advice of the Cabinet,
and the Solomon Islands National
Parliament needed to pass an enabling
act to make the intervention legal.
Secondly, Canberra was reluctant to
go it alone because of the likely politi-
cal repercussions. It insisted on rally-
ing the support of the Pacific Islands
Forum (pif) so that a regional exer-
cise would be covered under the
Forum’s Biketawa Declaration of
2000, which “recognized the need in
time of crisis or in response to mem-
bers’ request for assistance, for action
to be taken on the basis of all mem-
bers of the Forum being part of the
Pacific Islands extended family” (pif
2000).
On 1 July, pif foreign ministers
met in Sydney to discuss the proposed
intervention, which Howard govern-
ment had by then named “Operation
Helpem Fren” (Operation to help a
friend). The Forum Island countries
unanimously endorsed the proposal
and many offered to contribute mili-
tary and police personnel to make up
the regional force. 
In Honiara, the government was
busy preparing the political and legal
frameworks required to enable the
intervention to take place. On 7 July,
to mark the 25th anniversary of the
country’s independence, the prime
minister reminded Solomon Islanders
that anniversaries are a time of cele-
brations, reflections, reconciliation,
and resolution for the future develop-
ment of the country (sibc, 7 July
2003). The national Parliament even-
tually met on 9 July to discuss and
pass the Facilitation of International
Assistance Act 2003, to facilitate the
deployment of foreign troops. There
was widespread support for the inter-
vention both in Parliament and in the
public. Many organizations and indi-
viduals publicly expressed their sup-
port for the intervention. 
Following the passing of the
enabling act and the formal invitation
from the governor-general, Austral-
ian, New Zealand, Fijian, and Tongan
troops and police gathered at the
Australian city of Townsville and
prepared to move into the Solomons.
On 21 July, the first regional troops
and police left Townsville for Solo-
mon Islands on board the Australian
Navy ship, hmas Manoora.
Perhaps in reaction to the deploy-
ment of foreign troops, on 23 July,
Harold Keke and his followers
released three hostages whom they
had held for weeks: two Melanesian
Brothers and a novice of the Church
of Melanesia. At that time it was not
known that Keke had killed seven
other members of the same religious
order.
On 24 July, the first regional troops
arrived in Solomon Islands, some by
the hmas Manoora and others by air.
Accompanying them was the Austral-
ian civilian leader of what by then
was being referred to as the Regional
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Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
(ramsi). He was Nick Warner, a
senior Australian diplomat. On his
arrival, Warner stated that the first
task of the assistance mission was to
restore law and order, and he
appealed to those who possessed
weapons to give them up (sibc, 24
July 2003). 
On 30 July, Warner met with for-
mer mef commanders Jimmy “Rasta”
Lusibaea and Moses Su‘u to discuss
the return of arms. This was followed
by the prime minister’s 31 July
announcement that amnesty would be
given for weapons returned between
midnight 1 August and 21 August,
allowing people to return arms with-
out the threat of being prosecuted. 
ramsi officials then met with other
militants on Guadalcanal and Malaita
to discuss the return of arms. Also
included in the discussions was Keke,
who in early August admitted to
Warner and his officials that he and
his followers had murdered the six
members of the Melanesian Brothers
whom they had taken hostage in
April, and another who had been
captured earlier. These discussions 
led to Keke’s surrender, on 13 August,
to the ramsi personnel in return for
protection. He appeared in court the
day after his arrest.
Two days after Keke’s arrest, the
Malaita Eagle Force surrendered
ninety-nine guns during the celebra-
tions of the Malaita Day at Auki. In
the weeks that followed, more guns
were surrendered. The process of dis-
armament was much more successful
than had initially been anticipated.
In August, armed with the success
of first few weeks of the regional
force’s operations, Prime Minister
Kemakeza headed for the pif meet-
ing in Auckland, where he thanked
regional leaders for assisting his
country. The pif leaders noted the
“marked improvement in law and
order. They particularly welcomed
the initial achievements, especially the
weapons surrenders” (pif 2003, 13).
The Forum also received commenda-
tion from UN Secretary General Kofi
Anan, who commented on the efforts
of Pacific Island countries in Solomon
Islands.
While the initial stage of the inter-
vention was successful, ramsi leaders
realized that for peace to be sustain-
able, Solomon Islanders must actively
participate. During the “Talking Truth
Program” on the Solomon Islands
Broadcasting Corporation (sibc), for
instance, ramsi Deputy Special Coor-
dinator Peter Noble said that sustain-
ability depends on the skills and the
ability of people to do any tasks for
the country; whether working for
nongovernmental organizations or the
government or performing technical
tasks, these jobs must be done by
Solomon Islanders (sibc, 20 Aug
2003).
On 24 August, Australian Prime
Minister Howard visited Honiara for
five hours to give moral support to
the troops and see for himself their
achievements. During his visit
Howard said that the next stage was
“to consolidate the gains in law and
order with a frontal assault on cor-
ruption and poor governance” (sibc,
25 Aug 2003). He also announced an
additional a$25 million as part of
Australia’s economic package to help
fund the Solomon Islands 2004 bud-
get. Howard also pledged support for
Kemakeza, despite local calls for the
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Solomon Islands prime minister to
step down because of allegations
about his involvement with militants
and misuse of public money.
While the Regional Assistance Mis-
sion was working on the issues of law
and order, the United Nations Devel-
opment Program continued its work
on the constitutional review, which
had started about two years earlier.
This was in relation to the establish-
ment of a federal system of govern-
ment, which, according to undp sur-
vey reports, received overwhelming
support. They toured all the provinces
of the country, consulting people on
the constitutional review and the pro-
posal for federalism.
Despite the restoration of law and
order, the recovery of the economy
was much less visible. In September 
it was reported that the government
had, by the end of August, already
spent 87 percent of its total budget
for 2003. This was over si$30 million,
or 30 percent ahead of the budgeted
expenditure. The Ministry of Finance
reported that the principal driving
force behind the higher than forecast
expenditure was massive spending by
the Ministry of Police, National Secu-
rity, and Justice (sibc, 22 Sept 2003).
In November, the government also
confirmed that its borrowing from 
the Central Bank of Solomon Islands
up to the end of October stood at
si$203.84 million, more than si$105
million above the normal ceiling
under the Central Bank Act and more
than si$72 million above what Minis-
ter of Finance Francis Zama referred
to as “the enhanced ceiling” under
the same act (sibc, 24 Sept 2003). 
Although the economy may have
improved slightly overall, this is not
visible at the rural areas where social
services did not get better. While 
most people did not expect the econ-
omy to improve dramatically, they 
did expect that the millions of dollars
of aid money being poured into the
country would have some immediate
impact. 
In September the government set up
a task force, headed by former Prime
Minister Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu, to
formulate an economic recovery plan.
This was also in preparation for the
2004 budget. To assist in the eco-
nomic recovery, the Australian govern-
ment paid over us$3 million in debt
arrears owed by Solomon Islands:
us$2.65 million to Asian Develop-
ment Bank and us$388,000 to the
World Bank. This allowed the banks
to resume operations in the Solomons
(sibc, 12 Sept 2003).
In September, Honiara again hosted
another regional leader. New Zealand
Prime Minister Helen Clark and Min-
ister of Defense Mark Burton visited
the Solomons to meet with the gov-
ernment and visit New Zealand
troops. During her visit, Clark
stressed the importance of the
restoration of law and order (sibc,
23 Sept 2003). In October New Zea-
land announced that it was donating
si$40 million for education.
One of the major events of 2003
was the passing of the 2004 budget in
November. The more than si$1 bil-
lion budget was the largest thus far in
the country’s history and was funded
largely by aid donors. For example,
aid donors fund 24.6 percent of the
revenue estimate and 100 percent of
the estimated development expendi-
ture (sig 2003). 
By December 2003, the impasse
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between the government and the
Solomon Islands Public Employee
Union, which started in September,
was still unresolved. Public employees
had requested a pay rise, which was
approved by Cabinet, but then turned
down by the prime minister. This
issued spilled over into 2004.
While much of the media coverage
and commentaries on Solomon
Islands concentrated on the negative
impacts of the civil unrest, the events
of the past five years have also had a
positive twist: they have forced
Solomon Islanders to come to terms
with the challenges of building a
nation-state out of culturally and eth-
nically plural societies, and reflect on
the social, political, and economic
challenges for the future. Governor-
General Sir John Lapli, for instance,
said that among the “pillars of
national unity and nation building”
must be “good beneficial reasons for
people of diverse and scattered islands
of Solomon Islands to want to belong
to this country.” The reasons for stay-
ing together, the governor-general
said, “must be sound, attainable, sus-
tainable and tolerated by these diverse
people” (sibc, 23 Sept 2003).
tarcisius tara kabutaulaka
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Vanuatu
At the beginning of 2003 Vanuatu was
governed by a coalition of the Vanua-
‘aku Party (vp), headed by the prime
minister, Edward Natapei, and the
Union of Moderate Parties (ump),
headed by the deputy prime minister,
Serge Vohor. Politics in Vanuatu were
dominated by events in three main
areas during that year: the manage-
ment of the Vanuatu Commodities
Marketing Board (vcmb); the man-
agement of the Vanuatu Maritime
Authority (vma); and the fortunes 
of Barak Sope, the former prime
minister who was jailed for forgery 
in 2002. These events generated
increasing dissatisfaction with the
Union of Moderate Parties as a
governing party and contributed to
another change of national govern-
ment in December 2003.
Before considering these events,
three postscripts to the police com-
missioner affair, which dominated
politics in 2002, should be mentioned.
To briefly recap, problems arose over
appointments to the post of police
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commissioner that were improperly
made. While the first such appoint-
ment was challenged peacefully in
court, the second appointment, in
mid-2002, resulted in police arresting
that commissioner and fourteen high-
ranking officials who were thought 
to have been involved in the appoint-
ment. In reaction to this, a number 
of armed Vanuatu Military Force
officers came to the police station 
to arrest these police, and an armed
standoff ensued. Rumors that a gov-
ernment-funded militia had also been
formed gave rise to fears of another
armed faction. This militia was
thought to be made up of young 
men from Tanna, a group blamed,
justifiably or not, for much violence
and crime in Vanuatu. By the end of
the year, tensions between the Vanu-
atu Military Force and the police
force had eased, and four high-
ranking police officers involved in the
arrests of the officials had been given
two-year suspended sentences for
inciting mutiny, mutiny, kidnapping,
and false imprisonment.
The first postscript to that story
is the appointment of Robert Diniro
Obed as police commissioner in Feb-
ruary 2003. He remained stable in
that position throughout the year.
A large AusAID-funded project aimed
at strengthening police capacity and
restructuring the Vanuatu Police Force
has also been implemented and will
contribute to stability and increased
efficiency in the police force. The sec-
ond postscript involves the four police
officers who had been given suspended
sentences for their involvement in
events of 2002. The prosecutor
appealed their sentences “on the basis
that the sentences imposed on the four
men were manifestly inadequate.” The
Court of Appeal upheld the appeal on
the grounds that “there can never be
any justification for anyone in a free
and democratic society taking the law
into their own hands. After their years
of service, training and discipline in
the Police, each of these men knew
that they were bending the rules.
There is nothing more corrosive or
damaging in society than that sort of
behaviour by police officers” (Public
Prosecutor v Simon 2003). The third
postscript is that the government
reportedly made a payment of over
1 million vatu to a “civilian backup
force” made up of men from Tanna,
which had briefly been formed during
the instability of August 2002 (VDP,
9 Jan 2003). Whether members of
this group were armed at any point,
or still have arms, is not known.
The fortunes of Barak Sope in
2003 are less a postscript on events of
2002 than the unfolding of another
chapter in this prominent politician’s
career. The leader of the Melanesian
Progressive Party (mpp) was sen-
tenced to three years’ imprisonment
for forging government guarantees in
mid-2002. As the result of this con-
viction Sope lost his seat in Parlia-
ment. In November 2002 Sope was
pardoned by the president and imme-
diately made known his intention to
challenge the loss of his parliamentary
seat in court. In February 2003 the
Supreme Court heard the case and
rejected Sope’s challenge. Although
the court acknowledged that a presi-
dential pardon has the effect of mak-
ing “the offender a new man,” the
wording of the Members of Parlia-
ment (Vacation of Seats) Act [Cap
174] were taken into account. Under
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that act, once a member of Parlia-
ment is convicted and sentenced to 
at least two-year imprisonment, his 
or her seat becomes vacant after a
period of thirty days. Because the
presidential pardon occurred outside
of this thirty-day limit, Sope’s seat
was vacated before he was pardoned.
A pardon cannot be retroactive, so
the pardon did not restore Sope’s seat
to him. However, as a result of the
pardon, Sope was allowed to run in
the by-election for the seat that he
previously held. In May the Court of
Appeal rejected Sope’s appeal against
the Supreme Court decision (Sope v
Speaker of Parliament 2003), thereby
opening the way for a by-election later
in the year. The by-election was held
on 27 November. Four candidates
stood: Sope (mpp), Foster Rakom
(vp), and two independent candi-
dates. Voter turnout was a low 46
percent, and Sope was reelected by a
comfortable margin, winning 2,524
votes, with Rakom, his nearest rival,
polling 1,915 votes. No clear
response to this outcome has come
from aid donors, investors, or others,
in part, perhaps, because the result
was unsurprising. As reported earlier
in the year, “jailing has increased
[Sope’s] popularity among local ni-
Vanuatu, who regard him as strong
on land issues and Vanuatu national-
ism” (VDP, 14 Jan 2003).
If the reelection of Sope had
occurred in a different year it might
have attracted more commentary.
However, with events concerning 
the Vanuatu Commodities Marketing
Board and Vanuatu Maritime Author-
ity dominating political news, stories
of Barak Sope’s return to power
became the political equivalent of a
human-interest story: straightforward
and easy to understand, something 
for people to shake their heads at and
have a wry chuckle over. vcmb events
dominated in the first half of the year.
The board is a statutory body that, at
the beginning of the year, had respon-
sibility for the purchase, sale, and
export of prescribed commodities,
particularly copra. As copra is the
primary cash earner for most of the
rural Vanuatu population, vcmb
operations directly affect many peo-
ple. Problems with vcmb manage-
ment have been going on for some
time. Improper use of funds, unsound
investments, political interference, and
general mismanagement have been
documented as far back as 1996, in
one of the first reports by the Vanuatu
Ombudsman (Vanuatu Ombudsman
1996). vcmb financial problems were
compounded in 2001 when the world
price for copra fell. The ump-domi-
nated government of the time, as a
ploy to ensure popularity and gain
votes in the upcoming election,
instructed the marketing board to pay
higher prices to farmers than they
could sell the copra for. As a result,
the board was losing about 6,000 vatu
(us$45) per ton (Reid 2003). By early
2003, vcmb problems became more
prominent as the local copra market
ground to a halt. vcmb agents were
not paying producers, with the result
that the cash basis of rural island
economies was being eroded. Inter-
island shipping companies were not
being paid, either. In February a notice
was filed to table a no-confidence
motion in the government, although
a motion did not arise at this point.
This was largely prompted by concern
over involvement of the Union of
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Moderate Parties with the marketing
board. Also fueling dissatisfaction
were recently revealed details of a
67 million vatu (approximately
us$574,000) “redundancy payment”
package that had been paid to vcmb
staff in early 2002, although most of
them continued to work for the mar-
keting board. This may sound more
outrageous than it actually is, as the
Vanuatu Employment Act [Cap 160]
requires employers to pay severance
allowance to terminated employees
in many situations. A number of
employers “spread the load” of pay-
ment by terminating employees and
paying severance allowance, then
reemploying the same employees at
regular intervals. The “redundancy
payment” package can, in part, be
considered a way of managing sever-
ance payments. However, even on
this, most generous reading of vcmb
actions, members of staff were paid
about 42 million vatu (approximately
us$360,000) more than the act pro-
vides for (VDP, 6 Jan 2004).
By the end of February some 
steps were taken to resolve problems,
including the suspension of the gen-
eral manager over mismanagement
issues, and proposals to restructure
the marketing board as a regulatory
body. The price of copra paid to pro-
ducers was also reduced in February,
a move that may have been unpopu-
lar with growers but was necessary
given the marketing board’s financial
position. In April, fifty-eight vcmb
agents, who were all political
appointees, were suspended.
Scandal continued to surround the
marketing board, however, with a
story in March that 42 million vatu
had been paid into a private account
rather than a vcmb account, and
another story in April alleging that
the board had issued copra export
licenses to two private companies.
This issuing of licenses was in breach
of an agreement with shipowners in
Santo, who had agreed to late pay-
ment of vcmb debts in return for a
promise that no licenses in competi-
tion with the marketing board would
be granted until the debts were repaid.
These licenses were particularly con-
troversial, as they were issued to com-
panies with ump politicians as share-
holders. In response to the problems,
the marketing board was removed
from the portfolio of ump Minister
for Trade and Industry Jean Alain
Mahe. In May, concerns arose over
the appointment of another ump man
(a close relative of ump President
Serge Vohor) as vcmb acting general
manager.
vcmb problems, combined with
low tourist numbers, have created a
shortage of foreign exchange in Vanu-
atu. As of April 2003, the Reserve
Bank of Vanuatu’s foreign exchange
reserves were only sufficient for 4.4
months of import cover. The low
availability of foreign currency is
continuing to affect private sector
businesses that import goods in
early 2004.
The vcmb situation, combined
with dissatisfaction over the intro-
duction of a debit tax, contributed to
more talk of a no-confidence motion.
A motion was listed for the June ses-
sion of Parliament but was later dis-
missed due to technical irregularities.
Changes within political parties also
contributed to rumors of a change 
in government. In April, Ham Lini
replaced Dinh Van Than as president
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of the National Union Party (nup).
One of the barriers to the National
Union and Vanua‘aku parties forming
a coalition had been Than’s nup pres-
idency. With this barrier removed, the
possibility of a new coalition looked
more likely. Around this time the
Vanua‘aku Party was also facing 
some internal discord, with the
party’s executive proposing a motion
to change three of the prime minis-
ter’s political advisors. The results of
the Luganville municipal election in
March was also taken as a sign of
growing discord between the national
coalition partners, Vanua‘aku Party
and Union of Moderate Parties. In
Luganville, the Vanua‘aku, National
Union, and Unity parties formed a
governing coalition following the
election. It was reported in the media
that the prime minister ordered vp
members to include the Union of
Moderate Parties in the coalition,
although the prime minister denied it.
However, the national government
coalition downplayed events in
Luganville as being a sign of a split,
and performed a ceremony in Port
Vila to confirm the ump and vp com-
mitment to the national government
coalition. There were other indica-
tions that a new vp /nup coalition
was not going to arise, including
opposition to the plan by the nup
Vice President Willie Jimmy (Pacific
Beat, 24 April 2003).
The vcmb situation and internal
party politics were soon overshad-
owed by reports of mismanagement
and corruption within the Vanuatu
Maritime Authority (vma). The
authority was established in 1998,
with the primary aim of regulating
and promoting the maritime industry.
Whilst there have been rumors of
political interference and mismanage-
ment almost since its establishment, it
was not until 2003 that vma opera-
tions flared up as a major political
issue. Attention was focused on Vanu-
atu’s maritime industry at the end of
2002, with the arrest of Robert Bohn
by the US government on charges
relating to a lottery fraud. The US
government froze a number of
accounts of companies he was
involved with, including those of the
Vanuatu Maritime Services Ltd (vms),
which administers the Vanuatu Ship-
ping Registry (vsr) on behalf of the
Vanuatu government. Registry fees
are split between Vanuatu Maritime
Services and the Vanuatu government.
Charges against Bohn were later
dropped. The utilization of vsr
revenue and the financial relationship
between the Vanuatu Maritime
Authority and the Vanuatu govern-
ment was called into question in
March when it was reported that the
maritime authority had not made a
rescue attempt on a vessel. One vma
response was that it did not have the
funds for a rescue attempt, as all
money from the Vanuatu Shipping
Registry goes through the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Management.
Such a statement is misleading, as the
maritime authority has its own bud-
get, and vsr revenue, just like any
government revenue, goes into the
central government coffers and is not
directly kept or necessarily spent by
the agency that collected it. It did,
however, help to confuse relationships
and suggest that the government was
somehow misappropriating vsr
money. In July, details were published
from an Auditor General’s report,
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indicating no financial impropriety on
the part of Vanuatu Maritime Services
Ltd (PVPO, 7 July 2003). As events of
the year unfolded, the concern about
the maritime services agency and the
shipping registry proved to be some-
thing of a red herring, and problems
clearly became centered in the Vanu-
atu Maritime Authority.
In April, Vanuatu Maritime Com-
missioner John Roosen left the mar-
itime authority. Then, in June, former
Vanuatu Ombudsman Marie Noelle
Patterson was terminated from her
position as the corporate director.
Patterson and another member of the
vma board, Lennox Vuti, had been
critical of French citizen Christopher
Emelee’s appointment as vma chair
because Emelee is manager of the
Tuna Fishing Vanuatu, a clear conflict
of interest. Another vma board mem-
ber, Wilson Aru, also had his own
boat and a clear conflict of interest.
There was also dissatisfaction about
raising the board’s sitting allowance
to vatu 12,000.
In August, vma Acting Commis-
sioner Timoci Bani, who had been
John Roosen’s counterpart and had
been trained for the position, was
suspended, and Donald Hosea was
appointed in his place. Hosea had
admitted to misappropriating vma
money in early 2002 and had been
placed on probation, and this appoint-
ment was widely condemned. It was
reported that Bani was not allowing
himself to be pressured into prevent-
ing the operation of a ship owned by
people that Emelee “has a personal
grudge against,” or into permitting
certain substandard ships (in which
vma members had personal interests)
to sail (VDP, 19 Aug 2003).
As a result of continued reporting
of vma stories in the Vanautu Daily
Post, on 4 September the newspaper’s
publisher, Marc Neil-Jones, was
assaulted outside of his office by
Emelee’s wife and three other people,
while Emelee and members of his staff
looked on. Afterwards Neil-Jones
required hospital treatment. The next
day in the Magistrate’s Court Emelee’s
lawyer filed for an injunction to pre-
vent the Daily Post newspaper from
publishing anything about the Vanu-
atu Maritime Authority or about
Emelee and his family. A magistrate
granted the injunction on 8 Septem-
ber, but the Supreme Court over-
turned it several days later (Jones v
Emelee 2003).
A concrete example of wrongdoing
then arose, in the form of the two
long-line fishing vessels that were
apprehended by the Vanuatu Police
Maritime Wing for fishing in Vanuatu
waters without a license. The first
boat was apprehended on 1 Novem-
ber, and the second on 4 November.
These boats, registered in China and
crewed by Taiwanese, are owned by
Sound Fishing Group, which is in turn
owned by John Simbolo, a former
director of Customs. Emelee is also
reported to have interests in Sound
Fishing Group. At the time of the
arrests they were displaying licenses
permitting them to fish from 7
November 2003–6 November 2004.
In a meeting between police and the
director of Fisheries, the latter claimed
that there had been an error in the
license, and it should have run from
27 October. However, the case was
referred to the public prosecutor and
charges of fishing without a license
were laid. On 11 November a letter
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from the Minister of Agriculture,
Stephen Kalsakau, was produced.
This letter, signed 29 October 2003,
provided a test fishing license allow-
ing the arrested vessels to operate
from 30 October 2003–6 November
2003. Charges were therefore with-
drawn.
The next twist was a police opera-
tion to collect evidence of forgery or
conspiracy to pervert the course of
justice. Police gained warrants to
search a number of places, including
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish-
eries, the Vanuatu Maritime Author-
ity, the office of Tuna Fishing Vanu-
atu, and the office of Sound Fishing
Group. Christopher Emelee was also
prevented from leaving the country,
and his passport was seized. Another
French citizen, Guy Bernard, who had
been appointed as a vma legal consul-
tant, also had his passport seized. In
February 2004 the Court will rule on
whether Emelee, Bernard, Kalsakau,
Simbolo, and vma Acting Commis-
sioner Less John Napuati have a case
to answer.
All of the strife surrounding the
Vanuatu Maritime Authority con-
tributed to the change of government
on 19 November. Rather than a vote
of no confidence, there was a change
in the coalition and a shuffling of cab-
inet portfolios. The National Union
Party and the Green Party replaced
the Union of Moderate Parties in the
governing coalition (PVPO, 19 Nov
2003). Prior to the reshuffle, the cabi-
net had been Edward Natapei (vp),
Prime Minister; Serge Vohor (ump),
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Sela Molisa (vp),
Minister for Finance; Willie Posen
(ump), Minister for Infrastructure and
Public Utilities; Jacques Sese (ump),
Minister for Education; Donald
Kalpokas (vp), Minister for Health;
Nicholas Brown (vp, Ind), Minister
for Ni-Vanuatu Business Develop-
ment; Jacklyn Ruben Titek (vp), Min-
ister for Lands, Geology and Mines;
Stephen Kalsakau (ump), Minister for
Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, and
Fisheries; Joe Natuman (vp), Minister
for Internal Affairs; Philip Boedoro
(vp), Minister for the Comprehensive
Reform Programme; Jean-Alain Mahe
(ump), Minister for Industry and
Commerce; and Raphael Worwor
(ump); Minister for Youth and Sports.
Following the reshuffle, the cabinet
is Edward Natapei (vp), Prime Minis-
ter; Ham Lini (nup), Deputy Prime
Minster and Minister for Infrastruc-
ture and Public Utilities; Moana
Carcasses (Green Party), Minister 
for Foreign Affairs; Sela Molisa (vp),
Minister for Finance; Donald Kalpo-
kas (vp), Minister for Education;
James Bule (nup), Minister for Health;
Nicholas Brown (vp, Ind), Minister
for Ni-Vanuatu Business Develop-
ment; Jacklyn Ruben Titek (vp), Min-
ister for Lands, Geology and Mines;
Sato Kilman (People’s Progressive
Party), Minister for Agriculture,
Livestock, Forestry and Fisheries; Joe
Natuman (vp), Minister for Internal
Affairs; Philip Boedoro (vp), Minister
for the Comprehensive Reform Pro-
gramme; Willie Jimmy (nup), Minis-
ter for Industry and Commerce; and
Mokin Stephen (nup), Minister for
Youth Development and Training.
It was not only ump involvement
in the vcmb and vma affairs that led
to the change in government. Spokes-
man for the Vanuatu government
Daniel Bangtor noted other reasons,
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such as a general lack of commit-
ment by ump ministers (including
not attending meetings), and “the fact
that the leader of the Union of Mod-
erate Parties (ump) Mr. Serge Vohor
had been initiating negotiations with
the opposition group to form an
alternative coalition arrangement”
(Pacific Beat, 26 Nov 2003). ump
interference with the boards of Air
Vanuatu and Vanair and the Vanuatu
Broadcasting and Television Corpora-
tion were further reasons for dissatis-
faction with the party. Following the
change in government, all ump-
appointed board members were
removed from all three of these bod-
ies. Other occurences since the forma-
tion of the new government include
the removal of Christopher Emelee
as chair of the vma board; he was
replaced by Lennox Vuti. The Vanu-
atu Commodities Marketing Board
(Amendment) Act 2003 also came
into force, altering the marketing
board’s role to one of industry
regulation.
The change of government has not
taken place without a fight, however,
and since the reshuffle there have been
ongoing talks of a vote of no confi-
dence (PVPO, 21 Nov 2003). The first
motion was lodged just after the
change but withdrawn a week later
(PVPO, 28 Nov 2003). Rumors of a
no-confidence motion during the 
first session of Parliament in 2004
continue.
This national politicking is of little
concern to many ni-Vanuatu, for
whom the biggest political story of
2003 was the commencement of a
debit tax. This is a tax on withdrawals
from banks. The Debit Tax Act was
passed in 2002 and commenced in
July 2003. Almost immediately after
the law was enacted, talks of protests
against the new law began. In March
2003 protest took the form of vandal-
ism on the Reserve Bank of Vanuatu
building and the residence of the
Minister of Finance. The Vanuatu
Association of Non-Governmental
Organizations (vango) led initiatives
for a more peaceful protest, but this
protest was blocked for several
months by the refusal to issue a per-
mit for the protest. On 22 August the
protest finally went ahead and was a
peaceful and controlled event. By this
stage the tax had already commenced.
By the end of the year many people
had accepted the tax as just another
charge on using the bank.
Management of the Vanuatu
National Provident Fund (vnpf) is
another political issue that is of con-
cern to the many ni-Vanuatu who
have money in the fund. The provi-
dent fund attracted attention in June
with stories that the general manager’s
contract had been extended illegally.
This was accompanied by reports of
problems with management, including
too much investment of funds over-
seas and bailouts by government. It
was soon revealed that stories of mis-
management and bailouts by govern-
ment were not correct, and that the
extension of the general manager’s
contract was wrong only because of 
a technicality, and not due to corrup-
tion. Soon afterwards, the general
manager resigned, stating that he had
been the subject of black magic. He
was also highly critical of Minister of
Finance Sela Molisa.
A bill to amend the vnpf Act was
also introduced around this time.
This bill would have had the effect of
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reducing contributions from 12 per-
cent to 8 percent (currently employees
contribute 6 percent of their salary
each month and employers contribute
a further 6 percent; contributions
were to be reduced to 4 percent each).
The proposed legislation would also
have reduced the amount of the fund
permitted to be invested overseas from
50 percent to 15 percent. This was
seen by many as a way to increase
political interference in the provident
fund. However, the Minister of
Finance maintained that this move
was proposed due to the need to
maintain currency stability, given that
foreign currency reserves were already
very low. The bill was withdrawn for
the midyear session of Parliament; it
resurfaced for the November session
of Parliament but was again with-
drawn. In August reports that the
provident fund was being pressured
into buying long-term government
bonds that were not of interest to
commercial banks because they were
not a good investment increased con-
cern about political interference in the
provident fund (VDP, 2 Aug 2003).
Molisa has also been involved in
internal struggles for leadership in the
Vanua‘aku Party, and some have
questioned his role in government.
The political events of 2003 have
been turbulent and many are ongoing.
For 2004 we can therefore expect to
see further developments in these
areas. However, whether Vanuatu will
settle into another period of relative
stability, or whether scandal and
changing alliances will continue to
affect politics, remains to be seen.
anita jowitt
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West Papua 
The year 2003 was marked by a pro-
liferation of erratic Jakarta politics
toward Papua and a related reconfir-
mation of the role of the Indonesian
National Military Forces (tni) in the
province. Parts of the military effec-
tively induced powerful elements in
the central government to support its
presence in Papua, on the one hand
by suggesting that there is a need to
stem secessionism, and on the other
hand by conniving at communal con-
flicts. In line with the current policy
of the Megawati government, the mil-
itary defines its role in Papua as safe-
guarding the unity of the nation and
its activities there as necessary to pre-
vent the “terrorist” acts of indepen-
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dence movements. By referring to
Papua as the second in line for seces-
sion after East Timor, elements of the
military have practically sidelined
Papua’s civil society organizations, its
intellectual elite, and significant parts
of the population that support resolu-
tions short of violence. Moreover,
since the Bali bombings in October
2002 and the explosion in front of 
the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta in
August 2003, the National Intelli-
gence Agency (bin) has positioned
itself at the forefront of the war
against terrorism and is attempting 
to take a leading role in drawing up
plans for Papua.
Positive developments were
expected to sprout from the Special
Autonomy law for Papua (Law No.
21/2001, commonly referred to as
Otsus, from its Bahasa Indonesia
name of Otonomi Khusus), which
would give more autonomy to local
communities in terms of equal sharing
of the benefits of resource extraction
and democratic governance. But these
faced a dead end after President
Megawati promulgated a decree on
the expedition of the implementation
of Law No. 45/1999 regarding the
creation of two new provinces (West
Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya),
three new regencies (Paniai, Mimika,
and Puncak Jaya), and one municipal-
ity (Sorong). The plan to divide the
province was actually devised in the
early 1980s by then Irian Jaya Gover-
nor Busiri Suryowinoto and Minister
of Home Affairs Supardjo Rustam.
The idea was to Papuanize the
bureaucracy, beginning at the district
level, and create six provincial levels
based on the administrative areas
demarcated by the colonial Dutch
government. The plan was shelved
largely because there were not enough
qualified locals to fill the required
positions. In 1999, the division of the
province was proposed again by the
transitional government of President
Habibie as a way to speed up the
“pemekaran” (blossoming), or admin-
istrative fragmentation, of the prov-
ince. However, the law was suspended
after sweeping resistance in Papua,
where the provincial government and
a majority of the people feared that it
would spread discord among the peo-
ple of Papua.
On 27 January President Megawati
issued the decree that raised the mat-
ter again, apparently as a result of
bin and security leaders encouraging
groups of Papuans to lobby for the
change to three provinces. The decree
was issued without consultation with
local communities, the provincial gov-
ernment, or leaders of religious and
other civil society organizations. Mal-
content Papuan political elements
were mobilized by Provincial Secre-
tary Decky Asmuruf and Brigadier
General (ret) Abraham Atururi, the
former regent of the Sorong Regency
who had lost against the current gov-
ernor, Jaap Solossa, during the elec-
tion rally in 1999. Shortly after the
decree was issued, the Ministry of
Home Affairs appointed Asmuruf as
the chair of the assistance team for
the pemekaran. During interviews
with journalists, Asmuruf made no
secret of his aspiration to become
governor of Central Irian Jaya.
Despite growing controversy over
the status of the province, the Minis-
ter of Home Affairs, Hari Sabarno,
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inaugurated Atururi as the governor
of West Irian Jaya in November,
leading to a barrage of criticism 
from Papuan leaders and people. The
Speaker of the Papua provincial legis-
lature, John Ibo, said that the inaugu-
ration contradicted a recommenda-
tion issued by the People’s
Consultative Assembly during its lat-
est annual session, recommending
that the government should revise the
law on the division of Papua. Atururi
arrived in Manokwari in February to
start work on the establishment of
new provincial headquarters. On the
way from Jakarta he stopped in Jaya-
pura to present to Speaker Ibo an
official bin statement signed by its
head, Lieutenant General (ret) Hen-
dropriyono, saying that Atururi has
the authority to establish West Irian
Jaya. According to a Manokwari-
based legal-aid organization, local
customary leaders were supporting
the creation of a new province
because the division plans would lead
to the establishment of twenty-eight
new regencies, including Teluk Bin-
tuni. The importance attached to the
creation of a separate Teluk Bintuni
regency is related to the operations of
the Tangguh liquified natural gas
plant in the area, managed by British
Petroleum. The new regency, and the
new province of West Irian Jaya of
which it is part, will be abundantly
rich in natural resources.
In Timika, the headquarters of the
other new province, Central Irian
Jaya, riots broke out when the head
of the Timika legislative council,
Andreas Anggaibak, supported by a
group called “Group of Seven Tribes,”
announced the official establishment
of the province in late August. Anggai-
bak’s alliance met with opposition
from a youth group of the Amungme
people led by Yopie Kilangin and sup-
ported by other ethnic groups in the
regions. The conflict about pemekaran
is an extension of older disputes
between the communities close to the
Freeport mining operations, relating
to the misuse of company funds and
collaboration with the military in the
region. This year’s outbreak of vio-
lence, during which five people were
killed and dozens were injured, will
not be the last until the social divi-
sions are settled through the develop-
ment of a sustainable plan for the
extraction of resources and progress
for the local communities.
For the pro-pemekaran players
in Papua the game revolves largely
around personal status, access to
the territory’s riches, and the Otsus
funds. These funds are obtained from
2 percent of the total amount of the
state budget and amounted to around
1.3 trillion rupiah (about us$15.8
million) for the 2003 fiscal year. That
the appointed governor of West Irian
Jaya also supports the implementa-
tion of Otsus makes sense in this
respect. Another possible motive for
the partitioning of Papua concerns
the role played by the military. One
inevitable consequence of the creation
of three provinces in Papua will be a
significant increase in the number of
troops in the territory. Each of the
separate provinces will have its own
regional military command (Kodam),
with its network of district and sub-
district commands (Koramil and
Korem), at a more substantial level
than presently exists. That this will
 
412 the contemporary pacific • fall 2004
likely create a more effective system
of repression throughout the territory
arouses the suspicion that this may
have been a major reason for dividing
Papua.
As it will take at least ten years
to get things running efficiently and
because the capabilities of newly
recruited personnel will initially be
limited, the power and quality of the
new civil administrations will be poor.
In such a situation corruption and
nepotism are likely to thrive, leading
to more disenchantment among local
people and stimulating local atrocities
as well as violent protests. This may
well pave the way for the Kodams to
virtually establish military rule, and
when necessary, impose martial law
in response to unrest. Moreover, the
National Military Forces will gain
more opportunities to raise funds
from external sources to supplement
the 30 percent of its budget that is
provided by the state. Central Irian
Jaya has the world’s largest gold and
copper mine, operated by Freeport
McMoRan. The security of the mine
has so far been under tni control,
allowing the company access to
profitable deals and virtual freedom
of movement under the Suharto
regime, and leading to an appalling
record of human rights violations.
The attempt of British Petroleum to
build trust among the local communi-
ties in the Bintuni Bay, and involve
them as stakeholders in the Tangguh
operations, appears to have prompted
elements of the armed forces to desta-
bilize the region, thereby promoting
the impression that they are needed to
safeguard the operations from
“Papuan rebels.”
The politics and controversies sur-
rounding the issue of pemekaran were
widely discussed in the national news,
generally in terms of the gradual
acceptance of the politics of chaos as
a way to gain political power and to
secure access to resources and rev-
enues. It was also argued that any
division of administrative organiza-
tion in Papua should be based on a
thorough assessment of social and
cultural realities. The focus should 
be on improving the quality and
efficiency of governance at the district
levels, and the creation of more dis-
tricts with borders that match cul-
tural, linguistic, and customary
boundaries. Otsus provides for a fair
representation of all groups in Papua
and the division plans have frustrated
those Papuans who were hoping that
a Papuan representative council
would allow local communities to
play a democratic role in the develop-
ment of their land.
Since the beginning of Megawati’s
presidency, the people of Papua seem
to have no choice but to add the
prospects of Otsus to the already
extensive history of unfulfilled prom-
ises made by Jakarta. Again, their
memories are imprinted with the fail-
ure of Jakarta in bringing social jus-
tice and opportunity to its citizens in
Papua. Instead, policies have favored
opportunities for the elite to gain
access to sources of wealth. Having
secured access to political power and
lucrative business deals, significant
numbers of the elite in Papua have
ceased to insist on further reform;
instead, they seek order and stability.
At the same time, Jakarta feels ever
freer to derail the dialogue-based
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reconciliation initiatives of Papuans
and their powerful and instructive
nonviolent responses to military-
instigated terror.
Amid significant international sup-
port for Otsus as the best available
option to curtail the conflict in Papua
and provide a better future for the
Papuans, the National Intelligence
Agency and the National Military
Forces seemed to fear that all of this
would give impetus to groups in
Papua and foreign nongovernment
organizations advocating indepen-
dence. At the same time, Jakarta sees
that the US and most European gov-
ernments are most likely to agree to 
a crackdown on the “terrorist” Free
Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka, or opm). In a spate of pub-
lic speeches and during official meet-
ings, military leaders and security
people used rhetoric that downgraded
the involvement of the military in ter-
rorizing Papuan communities and
emphasized the need to curtail terror-
ist activities that might destabilize the
region. For example, the protest in
Papua in early February about the
pemekaran was followed quickly by
responses of the Coordinating Minis-
ter for Political and Security Affairs,
Major General (ret) Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, among others, stating
that the international community
should stop meddling in Indonesia’s
internal affairs.
Yudhoyono’s attack was directed
against foreign researchers and non-
government organizations, particu-
larly from Australia and the Nether-
lands, who are trying to mobilize
support for the independence of West
Papua, as such individuals and groups
did in East Timor in the years before
independence was achieved there. Two
days before the end of 2002, Yudho-
yono declared that the Otsus status
accorded to Papua (and Aceh) would
be final, and any move to secede from
the country would not be tolerated.
He stated that there was no possibil-
ity for the two provinces to hold a
vote of self-determination like that
held in East Timor. Yudhoyono said
that he knew that “political elements”
from Papua had gone to many coun-
tries to get support, including the
United States, Europe, Australia, and
New Zealand. President Megawati
broached the issue of international
pro-separatist groups during a visit 
of Australian Prime Minister John
Howard in February. A few months
later Howard offered to investigate all
aid agencies working in Indonesia
using Australian government funding.
In late 2002, the national news fea-
tured I Made Pastika, named Time’s
Asian Newsmaker of the Year for his
outstanding performance in finding
the alleged perpetrators behind the
Bali bombing. Not mentioned was his
role as head of the police investigation
into the killing of two American citi-
zens and one Indonesian during an
ambush near Timika of buses trans-
porting schoolchildren of the Freeport
international school on 31 August
2002. The investigation established
convincingly that the shooting was
the work of tni Special Forces
(Kopassus), and that it appeared to 
be related to their recent struggle with
Freeport over alleged stealing of com-
pany property and demands for a
financial increase of the security deal.
With Pastika busy heading the investi-
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gation into the Bali bombing, Papua
lost an unusually daring head of
police and there was a risk that the
spotlight would come off the terrorist
actions of Kopassus.
Nevertheless, Indonesia came
under pressure from the United States
because of the Timika ambush. In
mid-January 2003, Nancy Spier,
whose husband Rich Spier was killed
during the ambush, lobbied US
administration and congressional
representatives to halt the Interna-
tional Military Education and Train-
ing (imet) funding. Spier claims there
is evidence that the Indonesian mili-
tary was behind the ambush. Con-
gress had first voted to restrict imet
funds for Indonesia in response to the
12 November 1991 Santa Cruz mas-
sacre in East Timor. All military ties
were severed in September 1999 as
the Indonesian military and its militia
proxies razed East Timor following
its pro-independence vote. Spier’s
campaign contributed positively to
the discussion and the decision to sus-
pend the funding for the training.
Further information emerged in
March about one of the possible
motivations for tni involvement in
the ambush—to pressure the mining
company to keep up protection pay-
ments to the military. A leaked report
prepared for Freeport shareholders
revealed that the company had paid
over us$11 million to the army over
the last two years as part of this
extortion racket. Previously the com-
pany had admitted to making a one-
off payment of us$37 million to
establish a military base camp but
denied making regular payments.
US legislators were obviously
concerned about being seen to be
completely indifferent to the possible
murder of two US citizens. On 16
July, the House of Representatives
amended the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for 2004–2005 to
bar imet funding for Indonesia until
it is certified that Indonesia is taking
effective measures to investigate and
prosecute those responsible for the
Freeport murders. In late 2003, the
US Congress approved us$4 million
for the Indonesian military for coun-
terterrorist training. Early in 2004
there was talk about a joint police
and military inquiry into the Timika
ambush, which would be conducted
in cooperation with the fbi. How-
ever, during the fbi’s initial efforts to
investigate, tni officials would not let
soldiers in Papua be interviewed with-
out superiors present or permit the
fbi to conduct forensic tests on evi-
dence. It was only after Washington
linked military assistance to coopera-
tion that the fbi was allowed to bring
home some evidence for analysis. It
was widely discussed in international
media that by focusing primarily on
terrorism the United States is progres-
sively committing a political blunder
in Indonesia. It is much more impor-
tant to assist the Indonesian govern-
ment and Indonesian civil society in
building democratic institutions, as
well as revitalizing the economy and
the educational system.
This year saw both the departure
and the full-swing return of Kopassus.
Kopassus withdrew from Papua after
investigations revealed that twelve
Kopassus members were behind the
brutal assassination of Papuan leader
Theys Hiyo Eluay in November 2001.
At the farewell ceremony in late Feb-
ruary, the tni provincial chief, Major
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General Mahidin Simbolon, stated
that the team would not be replaced,
considering the stable security situa-
tion in Papua. The trial of Kopassus
members in relation to the killing of
Eluay began on 3 January. Right after
the beginning of the trial, military
commander General Endriartono
Sutarto maintained that a separatist
group in Papua had been struggling
to establish a public perception that
the military was involved in a series
of violent acts. On the same occasion,
Indonesian National Police Chief
General Da’i Bachtiar said that the
police had always been impeded by
gunshots during investigation of vio-
lent crime scenes in Papua. In April,
the military court in Jakarta found
seven Kopassus soldiers guilty of
involvement in the death of Eluay
and imposed relatively light prison
sentences ranging from two to three-
and-a-half years. These light sen-
tences sent the message to the people
of Papua that it is still very hard for
them to receive justice.
On 4 April, the military command
post Kodim 1702 in the central high-
land district of Jayawijaya was
attacked by what the military quickly
reported to be a group of opm rebels.
Some ten people seized twenty-nine
m-16 machine guns, pistols, and a
significant amount of ammunition.
Two soldiers and one of the attackers
died during the attack. Within a few
days, Brimob (the mobile brigade of
the police) and Kopassus troops from
military headquarters in Jakarta were
sent to Wamena for intensive military
investigation. The raid of the Kodim
office provided a clear excuse for
Kopassus to return to Papua. Soon
after the return of Kopassus, senior
tni officials admitted publicly that
soldiers may have been involved in the
attack on the Kodim armory. Even so,
the military response to the Kodim
ambush was harsh. After a few days,
the military commander for Papua,
Brigadier General Nurdin Zainal,
announced that the operation would
continue until all the missing weapons
were found. Within five days they
recovered nineteen weapons, but the
operation continued. Toward the end
of April, nine staff members of the
military office in Wamena were trans-
ferred to the Kodam in Jayapura in
connection with their involvement in
the incident. So far, excessive verdicts
have been passed on the “opm”
weapon thieves and thirteen “opm
leaders” in Wamena who were sud-
denly arrested and some of them were
secretly transferred to the court in
Jakarta. The Jayapura-based military
command alleged that only a few
houses had been burned during the
operation because they were used as
hiding places for opm members.
An ad hoc team called Coalition,
consisting of ngo workers and people
from religious organizations, was set
up to monitor the case and to provide
legal aid to the arrested. They encoun-
tered great difficulties in getting
access to the region and in being able
to visit and talk to the detained. In
late May, the military in Wamena
managed to intimidate seven wit-
nesses to withdraw incriminating
statements they have made in their
testimony to the Coalition. At the
same time, two members of the Coali-
tion were interrogated by the military
without having been charged. Never-
theless, in the months following the
attack on the Kodim armory, the
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Coalition was able to confirm a spate
of communications about burning of
tens of houses; destruction of villages
(most notably the village of Kwiya-
wagi in the Kuyawage district); rape
of women; indiscriminate killing of
men; and over a thousand people
seeking refuge in Tiom, Ilaga, and
Mulia. Moreover, the Coalition’s
lobby toward the Indonesian Human
Rights Commission (Komnas ham)
and regular calls from leaders of reli-
gious groups in Papua resulted in the
formation of an investigative team in
mid-July that was scheduled to com-
mence its investigations in August. It
took until January 2004 before it was
officially announced that a Komnas
ham team would begin to probe
human rights violations in Papua.
Over the course of the year, it
became increasingly difficult for
human rights and legal aid organiza-
tions to conduct their work freely, in
an atmosphere of ongoing harassment
and intimidation. On 29 December
2002, the Jakarta Post reported that
unidentified men shot four women,
including Elsie Rumbiak Bonay, the
wife of Joanis G Bonay, director of
the Papua-based Institute for 
Human Rights Study and Advocacy
(elsham). The shooting happened
near an immigration post close to the
Indonesia–Papua New Guinea border.
The police failed to hold an on-site
investigation after gunmen fired at a
joint police-military convoy heading
for the site of the shooting. Two mili-
tary personnel were wounded in the
attack. National newspapers reported
that the head of the Kodam believed
that Mathias Wenda, a prominent
opm member, was responsible for the
shootings. elsham speculated that
the attack against Bonay’s wife might
be related to the human rights group’s
recent accusation that the military
was behind the August 2002 Freeport
ambush. In June 2003, the new tni
military commander, Major General
Nurdin Zainal (who replaced
Brigadier General Simbolon, reas-
signed to the army’s command in
Jakarta because of his links to the
Timika attack) proceeded with a
lawsuit against elsham regarding 
the organization’s initial findings in 
its investigation into the Timika
shooting. Since then, elsham work-
ers, legal aid activists, and their rela-
tives have increasingly received
threats in connection with their state-
ments to the media regarding the
Timika and Eluay cases.
The behavior of the military led to
tensions and stress among local com-
munities, and throughout the year,
many people where forced to surren-
der as opm members. These surren-
ders were then reported by the mili-
tary as the results of their persuasive
approach. While the 2002 Freeport
shooting appears to be related to con-
cerns over the security deal between
Kopassus and the mine, the Wamena
case highlights the perverse coopera-
tion between elements of the Free
Papua Movement and the security
forces. The regional command struc-
tures of Kopassus have seemingly
unlimited power to terrorize local
communities.
Toward the end of 2003, Papua-
based newspapers speculated exten-
sively about another strategy pursued
by the military to exert control over
Papua, reminiscent of the dynamics 
of the violence that victimized major
parts of East Timorese society for
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decades. After some two years of
unrest in Papua over the establish-
ment of the Laskar Jihad militia in
the towns of Sorong and Fak-fak, fur-
ther rumors circulated about the mili-
tary helping to establish bases for
militias. These were provoked by the
reports that a former East Timor mili-
tia leader, Eurico Guterres, planned
to set up a nationalist youth group
called Front Pembela Merah Putih
(Red and White Defenders Front) in
Timika, and news about the appoint-
ment of a new chief of police for
Papua, Timbul Silaen, who had been
police chief in East Timor during
1998–1999. Guterres worked along-
side Silaen in East Timor and was
convicted of committing crimes
against humanity in East Timor. He
has been sentenced to ten years but
is not yet imprisoned, as his appeal
is pending. Silaen was accused but
cleared of a range of crimes in East
Timor. 
The proliferation of militias is
nothing new in Indonesia. The New
Order regime under President Suharto
made systematic use of civilian mili-
tias. While it may have been a stan-
dard counterinsurgency tactic, the
result was deeper polarization of
society in troubled areas, and less
accountability on the part of the gov-
ernment. Youth paramilitary groups
including Pemuda Pancasila and Ban-
teng Pemuda (the latter is now
headed by Guterres and is affiliated
with Megawati’s pdi Perjuangan, or
“Democratic Party of Struggle”) were
formed to mobilize against political
opposition on behalf of the ruling
party, Golkar. These groups set a
precedent for the proliferation of mili-
tias after Suharto fell. The problem is
that previously they all answered to
Suharto and Golkar; now they answer
to a host of different officials and
entities at all levels of society.
It is unclear whether the Front
Pembela Merah Putih is set up to
control the direct presidential election
on 5 July 2004 and the election for
legislators on 5 April. However, the
buildup to the elections will likely be
used by the military as an excuse to
increase its vigilance in areas that it
can present to Jakarta as vulnerable
to disruption by rebels. There are
numerous tensions that can be trig-
gered into conflict, perhaps the most
vulnerable being the widespread
opposition to pemekaran. People
opposed to this administrative frag-
mentation are generally politically
apathetic or support Golkar, while
the supporters of pemekaran, includ-
ing immigrants, business people, and
certain bureaucratic elites, support
Megawati’s pdi Perjuangan or vari-
ous Muslim parties. By late 2003,
the friction had increased markedly
between the Papuan Regional General
Elections Commission (kpud) and the
General Elections Commission in
Jakarta (kpu) about the appointment
of a secretary to the kpud provincial
chapter in West Irian Jaya to verify
legislative candidates in the newly
formed province. The government
of Papua in Jayapura has accused
the kpu of being infected with gov-
ernment interests, as acting governor
Atururi has required all legislative
candidates to accept the new province
of West Irian Jaya, even though the
province is not mentioned in the
Election Law.
The majority of people in Papua
are generally not interested in the
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elections. They sense the interference
of the central government and see that
it has no political commitment to
solve the prolonged conflict with
Papua. In both national and provin-
cial newspapers, critical observers
have noted that the elections could
turn violent in Papua if political
parties supporting pemekaran are
defeated. This could provide a con-
venient legitimization for the military
to flex its muscles, which in all proba-
bility will lead to violations of human
rights, most likely in the highland
region of Jayawijaya and locations
along the border with Papua New
Guinea. In any case, the disconnect
between Papua and Jakarta will
widen. Government leaders and
national policymakers increasingly
tend to rely on information they
receive from intelligence reports pro-
duced by a variety of sources with
questionable interests, generally con-
veying an exaggerated picture of what
is happening in Papua.
The unrelenting position of the
Indonesian government with respect
to carrying Otsus into effect; the
pressing ahead with the formation of
two new provinces; and the scarcely
legitimate and disproportionate mili-
tary operation in Wamena all bluntly
signal the government’s inclination
toward foolhardiness, violence, intim-
idation, and injustice. Not surpris-
ingly, many Papuans feel that the pre-
vious Suharto-led New Order regime
has made a comeback and is again
frustrating their often moderate aspi-
rations. The difference from five years
ago is that corruption and nepotism
are now decentralized, with numerous
Papuan leaders playing a part in a
system that effectively rewards people
who seek opportunities to redeem
past grievances for cash.
This year was characterized by
increasing military aggression, a fur-
ther crippling of the provincial gov-
ernment, and an avalanche of aston-
ishment among the people of Papua
about Jakarta’s lack of consideration
for the concerns of the people and 
its ignorance of the reasons behind
Papuan resentment. Ironically, certain
elements in Jakarta who claim to be
defending the territorial integrity of
the Indonesian Republic, by their
actions actually strengthen the seces-
sionist movement, both national and
international. Developments in 2003
have again shown that Jakarta’s con-
duct toward Papua falls woefully
short of the standards Papuans are
entitled to expect from a government
that claims to follow the Pancasila-
established principles of democracy
and pluralism. This bodes ill for the
still viable social basis in Papua that
supports a peaceful solution through
dialogue and increased sovereignty. 
jaap timmer
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